What the First Cause Is

Abstract

AbstractI show that the First Cause is not a series of changes (= events) describable by physical laws; rather, it is initially changeless and brought about the first event with the physical laws. It is distinct from the physical universe which is constantly changing according to quantum physics, and which does not have ‘the capacity to be the originator of an event in a way that is un-determined by prior event, and the capacity to prevent itself from changing’, which a First Cause must have. Thus, the First Cause cannot be part of the physical universe as postulated by Hawking’s no boundary proposal, which in any case is unproven and scientifically flawed. Rather, the First Cause is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, has libertarian freedom, and is enormously powerful, that is, a transcendent immaterial Creator. I reply to Thomistic objections and show that the conclusion of the Kalām Cosmological Argument (KCA) and the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo are consistent with both relational and substantival views of time, and with dynamic and static theories of time, and with both Craig’s Hybrid view (the First Cause is timeless sans creation and in time with creation) and the view of the Oxford School, both of which are defensible.