Abstract
AbstractPhilosophers have defined autonomy in a variety of ways. In this chapter, we present a Kantian account of personal autonomy as the capacity to set and pursue your own ends (which Kant refers to as “humanity”). We explain how this involves two distinct components: capacity and authenticity. To have autonomous capacities, you must possess baseline abilities (to form intentions, evaluate commitments, etc.); be free of external constraints; be free of certain cognitive inhibitions, and you must have a sufficiently wide range of options. In order for your desires to count as authentic, they must be free of manipulation and coercion, consistent with other motivational states, free from alienation, and they must not be adaptive preferences. After developing our conception of autonomy, we explain and defend Kant’s view that we are morally obligated to respect humanity in ourselves and in others. We conclude by briefly explaining why other moral theories have similar commitments to the moral significance of autonomy.
Funder
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Florida International University
Publisher
Springer International Publishing