Author:
Kamihigashi Takashi,Keskin Kerim,Sağlam Çağrı
Funder
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computer Science Applications,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Social Sciences,Applied Psychology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,General Decision Sciences
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